City SurveillanceCyber Security

CCTV Theft: The ICCC’s Weakest Point Is the Junction Box

Thefts from CCTV junction boxes in Mumbai, Lucknow, Bengaluru, Amritsar, Rajkot, Chandigarh and Ludhiana show that the steel box on the pole is part of an ICCC’s security design, not an afterthought

This post argues that the junction box that powers and connects a city’s cameras should be secured, monitored and contracted for like a piece of the command centre’s network, because a forced door costs a city its footage and can also leave a live port on that network for whoever opened it.

For more than six months, the camera network on Mumbai’s Coastal Road has been largely out of action. Repeated thefts have left all 66 cameras on its 10.58 km open stretch, barring the tunnel, not working. The cause is not a software fault but people stealing the cables that power them. Hindustan Times reported on 15 November that the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) has now asked Hindustan Construction Company (HCC) for a long-term engineering fix, after Larsen & Toubro (L&T) declined to help.[1] The outage got public attention after a speeding BMW went off the road on 20 September, killing three people, and police found the cameras were not working.[1]

It would be easy to file this as a Mumbai story about copper thieves. It is not. Over the past two years, Lucknow, Bengaluru, Amritsar, Rajkot, Chandigarh, Ludhiana and Mohali have all reported thieves opening the junction boxes that feed Safe City or city surveillance networks and walking off with batteries, UPS units and, in some cases, a network switch or router.

Mumbai has replaced about 110 km of cable and the Coastal Road cameras are still dark

Civic officials told Hindustan Times that cables on some stretches have had to be rebuilt or replaced two or three times. HCC, L&T and the operation and maintenance contractor have between them filed around 20 to 25 FIRs. The BMC says it has replaced roughly 110 km of power cables and asked senior police officers to step in.[1] Optical fibre carries the video; copper cable supplies the power. It is the copper, which sells well, that thieves want. When the BMC swapped copper for aluminium, that was stolen too.[2] The stretches worst hit are those easily reached from crowded neighbourhoods next to the road, near Mahalaxmi Temple, Madrasi Wadi, Markandeshwar Temple and Worli. Options under discussion include laying cables under the road, tying them down at short intervals, and switching to GSM or 4G cameras, each to be tested as a pilot first.[1][2]

Then there is the question of whose problem this is. In September, an L&T spokesperson told the paper that an engineering solution “does not form part of L&T’s contractual obligations”, though the company was talking to the BMC.[2] By November, HT reported, L&T had declined, saying the operation and maintenance of the cameras and cables had been separately assigned by the BMC.[1] Nobody is accused of wrongdoing, but a camera network can end up belonging to everyone and no one once the builders hand over.

The same junction boxes have been emptied in Lucknow, Bengaluru, Amritsar and Rajkot

Hindustan Times reported on 6 May that thieves struck Lucknow’s Safe City network on Shaheed Path on 25 April, taking UPS systems and batteries from camera control boxes. At least four cameras went offline. Teams replaced the equipment the next day, though some recorded footage was lost. The FIR was registered only on 5 May, ten days later.[3] In Bengaluru, The New Indian Express reported on 19 May that thieves had on 16 May taken two batteries, valued at about Rs 46,000, from CCTV junction boxes on Langford Road, part of the police Safe City project. Ashok Nagar police registered a case. The complaint, the paper said, was filed by the project director of Honeywell, the company contracted to maintain the system.[4] The paper called them junction boxes, which is the right term, and the one contracts should use.

Amritsar shows what happens when the thefts run on. The Tribune reported on 10 November 2025 that nearly 750 batteries, worth about Rs 50 lakh, had been stolen over 26 months from the city’s ICCC project. About 200 cameras had been put on mains power, so they went dark in a power cut, and surveillance was irregular at nearly 65 locations. At 40 sites, the paper said, thieves still removed batteries, cables, network switches and UPS units after metal framing had been added.[5] On 16 January 2026, The Tribune reported that city police had arrested four people and seized 17 batteries after two surveillance junctions were found emptied, and that the running total had by then risen to nearly 800 batteries.[6] Rajkot’s municipal Eye-Way cameras were hit in the same way. The Times of India reported on 13 September that, since June, thieves had broken the locks on outdoor CCTV units and stolen 30 industrial backup batteries worth Rs 90,000. Police said the thieves had opened roadside outdoor camera junctions.[7] The pattern is not new. In October 2024, Hindustan Times reported that 27 UPS batteries were stolen from junction boxes at ten traffic junctions in Mohali, where a city surveillance and intelligent traffic system was being set up. The locks were found broken; the junctions were yet to be made operational.[8]

In Chandigarh and Ludhiana, the break-ins have kept coming

Chandigarh has nearly 2,000 public and traffic cameras at about 287 locations, feeding an ICCC used for automated challans and emergency response. In August, Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), which maintains the system, warned the municipal corporation that at least 25 camera batteries had been stolen in a month. At a road safety committee meeting that month, 185 cameras were listed as not working, up from 115 in June.[9] In September, BEL listed eight field locations hit by burglaries, four of them along the Chandigarh-Delhi highway, and later reported that rack locks had been cut with grinders and field network systems damaged with cutting tools.[10][11]

Ludhiana’s first case this month, reported by Dainik Bhaskar on 3 November, is the one that should worry network engineers most. A police patrol in the Shimlapuri area found a Safe City junction box on a pole broken open at about 6:15 am on 1 November. Missing from it were a 2 kVA UPS, six 12-volt batteries, a power supply, a router and a Cisco network switch.[12] The batteries were probably the target; the switch and router went with them anyway. The Tribune reported on 7 November that batteries had again been stolen from Safe City cameras in Dugri Phase 2, after a manager from HFCL, the firm that manages the network, found them missing.[13] Dainik Bhaskar, writing on 8 November, said a third theft had come to light on 5 November near GNA College on Malerkotla Road, where three UPS batteries, switches, a power supply and a voltage stabilizer were taken, and that Sadar police had named four people in the FIR. The paper counted three Safe City equipment thefts in the city in seven days.[14]

A forced junction box is a network problem, not just a missing battery

Times of India’s reporting on Chandigarh describes these field locations as the points from which optical fibre runs out to cameras at junctions, city entry points and markets.[11] Each junction box is, in other words, a small node of the city’s surveillance network. In our view, a door that can be opened with a grinder in a few minutes is also a door to a switch port on that network, and a stolen router or switch may leave with its configuration still on it. That is our reading; none of the reports suggests the thefts were aimed at the network itself. But the security rulebooks already treat the box this way. CERT-In’s February 2025 guidelines for smart city infrastructure ask cities to plan for “cyber-physical resilience”, allow only authenticated devices onto the network, and recommend tamper-proof enclosures for smart streetlights.[17] NIST’s guide to operational technology security says equipment cabinets should be locked when not in use, unused ports should be disabled, and unsecured physical ports are a weakness in their own right.[18] We made a related point about edge boxes in field cabinets when we wrote about the OpenSSH flaw.

This is a national question of scale. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs told the Lok Sabha in July that ICCCs are operational in all 100 smart cities, and a ministry statement in August counted more than 83,000 CCTV cameras under the Mission.[15][16] Each of those cameras goes back to a junction box somewhere.

Our opinion: watch the junction box, lock it so the control room can see, and name its owner

The first fix is to make the junction box tell the control room when something is wrong, and to make an opening hard to hide. In Ludhiana, it was a patrol that found the open box on 1 November.[12] A door sensor, a UPS status feed and e-locks that report open and close status to the ICCC would, in our view, raise an alarm the moment the door is forced, without waiting for a battery to die or a camera to go dark. Chandigarh’s BEL noted that cameras had caught the faces of some thieves.[10] That only helps if the junction box itself is in the frame. A camera pointed at each box, not only at the traffic in front of it, gives an operator a chance to see who opened it. Built-in LED lights that switch on when the door is opened would make a quiet night-time theft visible to a patrol or to that camera.

The second is to assume that someone will one day plug into the box. That means switching off unused ports, allowing only known devices onto the live ones, as CERT-In recommends, and keeping traffic from the field away from the core of the ICCC.[17][18] When a switch or router is stolen, any passwords, keys or remote-access settings stored on it should be treated as exposed and changed. That is our recommendation; the reports do not say what any city did here. Amritsar’s experience, as The Tribune reported it, is a warning against stopping at a stronger cabinet: even after metal framing was added at some sites, batteries, cables, switches and UPS units were still taken.[5]

The third is paperwork, and Mumbai shows why it matters. CERT-In warns that when several teams handle integration, deployment and maintenance without clearly defined roles, the result is “gaps in coverage”.[17] BEL’s letter in Chandigarh pointed out that the junctions are municipal corporation property and asked the corporation to file the FIRs.[10] In Lucknow, the FIR came ten days after the theft, even though the cameras had been restored the next day.[3] An operation and maintenance contract should say who secures the junction box, who reports a break-in to the police, how fast equipment is replaced, and whether a camera knocked out by theft counts against uptime. We have argued before that the hard part is often deciding who patches cameras and building systems. Junction boxes belong on that list.

Wireless cameras on 4G, one of Mumbai’s options, would take the copper off the road. But they bring SIM cards and remote management interfaces of their own, which in our view need the same discipline over access and passwords. Wireless changes what can be stolen, not the need to know who can reach the camera.

Trisim Global Solutions control room solutions

Trisim’s view: an ICCC is only as secure as the junction boxes it never sees. If a forced door at a junction does not show up on a screen in the control room within minutes, the city has a blind spot on its own network, however good its video wall looks.

Sources

  1. Hindustan Times, Cable theft cripples 66 CCTVs across Coastal Road; BMC turns to HCC for long-term fix, 15 November 2026
  2. Hindustan Times, BMC turns to L&T to fix Coastal Road CCTV blackout, 27 September 2026
  3. Hindustan Times, Thieves blind ‘Safe City’ network on Shaheed Path; FIR filed after 10 days, 6 May 2026
  4. The New Indian Express, CCTV batteries from Bengaluru Safe City project stolen, 19 May 2026
  5. The Tribune, Smart City project in Amritsar faces setback after series of CCTV battery thefts, 10 November 2025
  6. The Tribune, Police bust racket involved in stealing CCTV camera batteries, arrest four in Amritsar, 16 January 2026
  7. The Times of India, Series of battery thefts hit RMC CCTV network across city, 13 September 2026
  8. Hindustan Times, Thieves wreck Mohali’s smart CCTVs, steal 27 UPS batteries, 21 October 2024
  9. Hindustan Times, Chandigarh: Battery thefts disrupt city surveillance grid, 19 August 2026
  10. The Times of India, BEL alerts MC after burglaries hit 8 CCTV network sites, 8 September 2026
  11. The Times of India, ICCC infra hit by fresh thefts, vandalism; BEL seeks tighter security, 12 September 2026
  12. Dainik Bhaskar, Thieves broke into Safe City camera boxes and stole a UPS, six batteries, and a router (Hindi), 3 November 2026
  13. The Tribune, Safe City cameras targeted again, batteries stolen in Ludhiana’s Dugri, 7 November 2026
  14. Dainik Bhaskar, Ludhiana Safe City cameras: thefts at three places in seven days (Hindi), 8 November 2026
  15. Press Information Bureau (Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs), Role of Integrated Command and Control Centres in Smart Cities (written reply in the Lok Sabha), 23 July 2026
  16. Press Information Bureau (Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs), Evaluations of Measurable Outcomes Delivered by SCM, 3 August 2026
  17. CERT-In, Cyber Security Guidelines for Smart City Infrastructure (PDF), 17 February 2025
  18. NIST, SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security, September 2023

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