Smart Streetlights: San Diego Switches Off Its Cameras Again
San Diego has switched off its smart streetlight cameras for the second time in six years because a vote against plate readers took the video with it, so smart poles must let each sensor be stopped and wiped on its own
This post argues that a city buying smart poles should insist that every camera and sensor on them can be switched off separately, that its data can be deleted on demand, and that its permitted uses are written in words a councillor would recognise, because San Diego has now lost its streetlight cameras twice over trust, not over technology. For Indian SPVs and urban local bodies, India’s data protection law will make that discipline a legal duty from May 2027.
On the night of Monday, 16 November, San Diego’s City Council voted 7-0 to withdraw permission for the police to use automated licence plate readers (ALPRs), the cameras that photograph number plates and make them searchable. Then, in a move few expected, it voted 5-2 to withdraw permission for the city’s Smart Streetlights as well.[1] The next day, all 500 plate reader cameras were due to go off, and police access was revoked except for two administrators closing the system.[3]
Why should an Indian city care about a police camera dispute in California? Because of the hardware. These were LED streetlights carrying a camera and a plate reader, bought as one package, and Indian command centres run the same kinds of functions, as we explain below.
One contract held both systems, so the streetlight cameras went down with the plate readers
The city’s contract is with Ubicquia, which installs and runs the Smart Streetlights, while Flock Safety works as a subcontractor running the plate readers.[3] Times of San Diego reported that the two camera systems “cannot be unbundled” in the city’s contract of nearly $12 million. That is why Councillor Henry Foster III asked for a separate vote on the streetlights: police officials had told the council that if both technologies lost approval, the city could cancel the contract.[1] A 2024 city release had already made the dependency plain. The cameras and plate readers, it said, “can only operate in conjunction with an LED streetlight.”[9]
The two systems collected different things. According to NBC 7, the plate readers took millions of photos of number plates each month, kept in a searchable database for about a month, while the streetlight cameras recorded video continuously and kept it for about two weeks.[3] In our view, a council might well have wanted to keep one and drop the other. The package made that choice much harder.
San Diego learnt in 2020 that a camera on a streetlight is hard to switch off
This is not the first shutdown. San Diego’s original smart streetlights, from 2016, were sold as a way to save energy and study traffic. They also carried cameras, which police used to help solve cases without the public knowing, KPBS reported. After residents objected, the then mayor ordered the streetlights shut off.[7] The city says a little over 3,000 smart streetlights had been deployed before they were deactivated in 2020.[8]
Voice of San Diego’s account of that shutdown should be read by anyone writing a smart pole tender. Turning the cameras off would have forced hundreds of streetlights to go dark, because both ran on the same power supply. Ubicquia removed the city’s credentials and cut the service layer. Its chief executive wrote that a software switch could be written as custom code, but “the units were not designed for this originally.” Because the cameras still had power, footage kept recording on a five-day loop. When the city asked for the retention time to be cut to zero, the company replied that it would help once it was paid for the previous year.[6]
That episode led to the TRUST ordinance, under which departments must list their surveillance tools, hold community meetings, go before a Privacy Advisory Board and win council approval for each technology.[7] The new streetlights and plate readers were the first technologies approved under it, in 2023, after nine community meetings and more than 100 questions from the board.[8]
This time, deletion and removal were in the contract
Some lessons were clearly learnt. NBC 7 reported that the vendors had pledged to deactivate and delete the data within 24 hours of the vote and send the city formal confirmation, and that the contract makes them remove the cameras at no cost to the city.[3] The 2024 safeguards were also substantial: training before access, a case or event number for every search, deletion of video after 13 days and plate data after 30, and digital masking of private property.[9]
| Question | 2020 shutdown | 2026 shutdown |
|---|---|---|
| Could the cameras be stopped quickly? | Not fully; the cameras shared the lights’ power supply | Plate readers scheduled to go off the day after the vote |
| What happened to stored footage? | Kept recording on a five-day loop; request for zero retention unmet | Vendors pledged deletion within 24 hours, with written confirmation |
| Who pays to remove the hardware? | No agreement in place | Vendors, at no cost to the city, under the contract |
Sources: Voice of San Diego for 2020; NBC 7 San Diego for 2026.[6][3]
A use policy that said “legitimate law enforcement purposes” was the weak point
What tipped the vote was not a hack. The item was due in December, but the council president brought it forward after news that police had used the plate readers to track one of their own officers and a domestic violence victim during an internal investigation.[2] The police department told NBC 7 that its internal affairs unit had used the system in six misconduct investigations, and argued this was allowed: its policy permits use for “legitimate law enforcement purposes” and its procedure for “official investigations”.[4]
The department insists there was no misuse, credits the cameras with helping solve 941 cases since 2023 and says searches are audited weekly.[2] Yet when a councillor asked why the council had not been told that people not suspected of any crime could be tracked, the police chief said he did not know, KPBS reported.[2] Seth Hall of the TRUST SD Coalition put it this way to NBC 7: he saw “a very wide gap” between how the department thought it could use the technology and what the council thought it was approving.[3] Others cited fears about federal immigration enforcement. “What has changed is the context,” said Councillor Stephen Whitburn.[1]
In our view, this is the part Indian cities should study most closely. San Diego had audits, retention limits and public approval, and still lost the system, because the written purpose was broad enough to cover a use the council had not imagined. Mayor Todd Gloria, who had backed the cameras, said afterwards that “public trust is essential for their continued use.”[5]
What Indian cities can learn from San Diego: five lessons for smart pole and ANPR projects
The Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs told the Lok Sabha in July that Integrated Command and Control Centres (ICCCs) use Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), facial recognition and crowd monitoring.[10] It counted 100 ICCCs and more than 83,000 CCTV cameras under the Smart Cities Mission in August.[11] We are not suggesting any Indian city has misused these systems. The lessons below are our reading of San Diego’s record.
Bundling decides what a council can switch off. San Diego’s cameras and plate readers sat in one contract that, as reported, “cannot be unbundled”.[1] An SPV that buys light, camera and ANPR as one line item gives up the option of keeping the useful parts.
Shared power means shared fate. In 2020 the cameras could not be cut without darkening hundreds of streetlights, and they kept recording because they still had power.[6] A dark street is a poor outcome for a privacy decision.
Broad purposes invite mission creep. The 2026 vote turned on uses the council had not imagined, and several councillors feared the federal government’s possible use of the data.[1] In our view, only a written purpose and a written sharing protocol hold the line.
Oversight keeps the system alive. A surveillance ordinance, a privacy board and weekly audits did not save the cameras once trust slipped.[7][2] Regular reporting to the council or SPV board protects a project rather than burdening it.
Whoever holds the data holds the leverage. In 2020 the vendor tied a zero-retention request to payment for the previous year.[6] In 2026 the council had to act before a $2 million fee fell due in December.[1] CERT-In’s smart city guidelines already list “unlawful surveillance” and insider threats among the risks to assess.[12] We have written about the junction boxes that feed an ICCC, who patches the cameras and the apartment data breach in Korea; a smart pole raises all three issues at once.
India’s data protection duties start on 13 May 2027, inside the life of any camera contract signed today
Under MeitY’s commencement notification of 13 November 2025, the core of the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023, including Sections 3 to 17, takes effect eighteen months after publication, and the DPDP Rules, 2025 follow the same timetable.[14][15] PIB confirmed on 14 November 2026 that Data Fiduciary obligations apply from 13 May 2027.[16] A five-year ICCC contract signed now will run well past that date.
In our reading, the city or SPV that decides why footage is collected is the Data Fiduciary, and the integrator is its Data Processor. City cameras will rarely rest on consent: Section 7(c) lets the State process data to perform any function under law, and the Section 5 notice duty is tied to consent, so signage is good practice rather than a strict requirement.[13] Section 8 still applies. The fiduciary answers for its processors, engages them only under a valid contract, must take reasonable security safeguards, must report a breach to the Data Protection Board and to each affected person, and must run a grievance mechanism.[13] Rule 6 asks for measures such as encryption or masking, access control and access logs kept for a year; Rule 7 wants a detailed breach report to the Board within 72 hours.[15] A body notified as a Significant Data Fiduciary must also appoint a Data Protection Officer based in India and an independent data auditor, and carry out a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and audit every year.[13][15]
Then there are the exemptions. Section 17(1)(c) lifts most duties, except accountability and security, where data is processed to prevent, detect or investigate offences; Section 17(2)(a) lets the Centre exempt notified agencies; and Section 17(4) relieves the State of the erasure duty in Section 8(7).[13] Relying on them is risky, in our view. They cover particular processing, not a whole programme; whether an SPV company counts as an instrumentality of the State is a question for lawyers; and the Supreme Court’s 2017 Puttaswamy judgment still requires any intrusion on privacy to have a basis in law, a legitimate aim and proportionality.[18] If the Act does not force deletion, the contract must.
GDPR rarely reaches an Indian ICCC, but EU-linked vendors and funders bring its standards
Filming a European tourist at an Indian junction does not by itself bring a city under the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. Article 3(2) reaches bodies outside the EU mainly when they offer goods or services to people in the EU or monitor behaviour “within the Union”.[19] The practical point is that EU-funded projects and global vendors bring GDPR-grade expectations: a DPIA, which Article 35 requires for large-scale monitoring of public areas, and data protection by design under Article 25.[19] The European Data Protection Board’s video guidelines are a good model.[20] The EU AI Act has, since February 2025, barred real-time remote biometric identification in public spaces for law enforcement except in narrow, authorised cases.[21] It does not bind Indian cities, but it signals where vendors may draw the line on live facial recognition.
CERT-In’s directions of 28 April 2022 under the IT Act, 2000 add two more duties: report cyber incidents within six hours, and keep logs for a rolling 180 days within India.[17] One ICCC breach can start both clocks.
Get compliance-ready before the tender, not after the cameras go up
Our advice for SPVs, urban local bodies and other municipal authorities is to settle the privacy design before the RFP goes out. Write a one-page purpose statement for each sensor and test it with a DPIA, even where the law does not yet demand one. Specify that the light keeps working if the camera is disconnected, and that each camera or ANPR unit can be switched off remotely, priced on its own and dropped without cancelling the whole contract. Then fix the operating rules:
- a retention schedule per data type, with automatic deletion
- an ICCC access log and audit trail, with a case reference for every search
- written, logged requests for any police or agency access
- public signage, a named grievance officer and a periodic independent audit
The vendor contract should bar secondary use, cover sub-processors, require breach notice within hours so the city can meet its own deadlines, keep data and logs in India, and oblige the vendor to return or delete data on exit with written confirmation. Add a removal clause at the vendor’s cost, as San Diego finally had in 2026.[3] None of this is legal advice; have counsel familiar with the DPDP Act review the tender and contract.

Trisim’s view: a smart pole is only as trusted as its least defensible sensor. If the city cannot switch that one sensor off, wipe its data and explain its use in a sentence, the whole pole is at risk, lights and all. From May 2027, that sentence will also have to satisfy India’s data protection law.
Sources
- Times of San Diego, San Diego council votes to shut off ALPR, Smart Streetlight cameras, 16 November 2026
- KPBS Public Media, City Council withdraws SDPD’s Flock authorization, but cameras remain, 17 November 2026
- NBC 7 San Diego, Here’s when Flock license plate reader cameras will turn off in San Diego, 17 November 2026
- NBC 7 San Diego, San Diego City Council votes to end Flock contract, turn off ALPR cameras, 16 November 2026
- City of San Diego, Office of the Mayor, Statement from Mayor Todd Gloria on City Council Action to Rescind Authorization for ALPRs and Smart Streetlights, 16 November 2026
- Voice of San Diego, San Diego Can’t Actually Turn Its Smart Streetlights Off, 2 November 2020
- KPBS Public Media, San Diego exempts police databases, security cameras from surveillance transparency law, with more changes likely, 24 January 2024
- City of San Diego (news release, PDF), SDPD Receives City Council Approval to Use Smart Streetlight, Automated License Plate Technologies, 1 August 2023
- City of San Diego (news release, PDF), Smart Streetlight, License Plate Recognition Technologies Advancing Investigations, 23 February 2024
- Press Information Bureau (Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs), Role of Integrated Command and Control Centres in Smart Cities (written reply in the Lok Sabha), 23 July 2026
- Press Information Bureau (Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs), Evaluations of Measurable Outcomes Delivered by SCM, 3 August 2026
- CERT-In, Cyber Security Guidelines for Smart City Infrastructure (PDF), 17 February 2025
- Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (PDF), 11 August 2023
- Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Notification G.S.R. 843(E): commencement of the DPDP Act (PDF), 13 November 2025
- Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025, G.S.R. 846(E) (PDF), 13 November 2025
- Press Information Bureau (MeitY), Consent Manager Registration Framework Comes into Effect; MeitY Secretary Launches Online Registration Portal, 14 November 2026
- CERT-In, Directions under sub-section (6) of section 70B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (PDF), 28 April 2022
- Supreme Court of India, Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., W.P. (C) No. 494 of 2012 (PDF), 24 August 2017
- Publications Office of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), 27 April 2016
- European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data through video devices
- European Commission, AI Act Service Desk, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (AI Act), Article 5: Prohibited AI practices
